The New Delhi Declaration is significant not merely because 11 governments with divergent strategic and economic interests endorsed a 45-page document, but because its economic provisions reveal the evolving ambitions of an increasingly consequential grouping. The declaration condemns unilateral tariffs and sanctions without explicitly naming the United States, supports greater use of local currencies in trade settlement, and calls on the New Development Bank (NDB) to raise the share of local-currency lending to 40% of its portfolio. It also reflects India’s concerns regarding the weaponisation of critical minerals and technology. 

Taken together, these commitments indicate the nature of India’s role within an expanding BRICS: not as an advocate of a new geopolitical bloc, but as an intermediary seeking to make the international economic system more resilient, diversified, responsive and restorative to the interests of emerging economies. The central question, however, is whether diplomatic influence can be translated into economic capacity. India’s long-term influence will depend increasingly on its ability to contribute to the institutions, payment systems, supply chains, and development finance mechanisms on which a more multipolar global 

economy will rest. 

The economic rationale for BRICS is substantial. The expanded grouping represents approximately 45% of the world’s population and around 28% of the global GDP. It accounts for roughly 35% of global manufacturing output and 43.6% of global crude oil production. Yet this physical heft is embedded in a financial architecture in which the dollar continues to dominate global reserves, export invoicing, foreign-exchange transactions, and payments. The disconnection between the geography of production and the architecture of global finance is therefore becoming increasingly consequential. The exclusion of Russian banks and subsidiaries from the Western financial networks has underscored the strategic significance of dependence on existing financial architecture. 

India’s position at the summit reflected this reality without embracing the more maximalist proposition of a common BRICS currency. The economic and monetary differences among BRICS members make a common currency institutionally difficult and politically improbable. India has instead supported more incremental forms of financial cooperation, namely bilateral local-currency settlement, interoperability among central-bank digital currency systems, and greater connectivity between national fast-payment platforms such as the UPI.

This approach aligns with India’s broader conception of BRICS as a non-Western, rather than anti-Western, formation. The objective is not to displace the dollar through confrontation, but to reduce transaction costs, facilitate trade and remittances, build greater resilience, and foster sovereignty in an international environment increasingly shaped by sanctions, export controls, market volatility, and geopolitical uncertainty. 

The question of financial infrastructure also helps explain India’s caution toward Chinese-led alternatives. China has developed sophisticated digital and payment networks, including the mBridge platform and Alipay+. India’s decision to remain outside such systems reflects a broader strategic principle: settlement infrastructure can become a source of geopolitical leverage because control over financial architecture can create effective chokepoints. 

The same consideration applies to supply chains. China’s restrictions on critical minerals and its position across processing and refining have demonstrated how concentrated control over strategic inputs can generate significant leverage. India’s emphasis on avoiding the weaponisation of critical minerals and technology must therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic position, but as an argument for greater diversification of global production networks. 

At the same time, India’s strategic autonomy is being tested by pressure from multiple directions. Washington’s efforts to discourage challenges to the dollar-based financial order coexist with India’s continuing economic engagement with Russia, particularly in energy and fertiliser. New Delhi is simultaneously deepening economic engagement with Europe and expanding cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific. The proposed European Union free trade agreement, continued purchases of Russian commodities, and exploration of alternative trade and energy routes alongside increasing bilateral commitments illustrate an approach based on diversification rather than exclusive alignment. 

This balancing strategy is one of India’s principal assets within BRICS. It allows New Delhi to engage with competing centres of economic power without becoming wholly dependent on any one of them. Yet strategic autonomy cannot remain primarily a diplomatic achievement. It must increasingly be supported by domestic productive capacity and institutions capable of absorbing external shocks. 

The New Delhi summit therefore points towards a broader set of priorities for India. 

First, India can build on its digital public infrastructure by positioning UPI and related payment capabilities as interoperable, open and rules-based platforms for BRICS and other Global South economies. Such an approach could reduce dependence on fragmented payment channels while providing India with an opportunity to shape emerging financial standards. 

Second, the critical-minerals question requires a shift from diplomatic signalling to industrial capability. India will need greater processing and refining capacity, long-term supply and offtake arrangements, strategic reserves, and partnerships with mineral-producing economies. Diversification will be meaningful only when it is supported by domestic capabilities across the value chain. 

Third, India can use its position in the New Development Bank more strategically. Expanded local-currency lending and infrastructure financing could strengthen connectivity with neighbouring and partner economies while reinforcing the wider institutional relevance of BRICS. The objective should be to translate India’s weight within the NDB into greater regional economic integration. 

Fourth, relations with China will require calibrated engagement. India’s interests lie neither in indiscriminate decoupling nor in excessive dependence. Investment and technical cooperation that strengthen domestic capabilities can be encouraged, while supply chains in strategically sensitive sectors should continue to diversify. Deeper economic engagement with Europe, Japan and other partners can reinforce this dynamic. 

Finally, energy security must remain a portfolio strategy. Russian crude, Gulf supplies, emerging Arctic routes and the expansion of renewable energy each contribute differently to resilience. The task is not to replace one dependency with another, but to reduce vulnerability through diversification. 

The New Delhi BRICS summit demonstrated India’s growing ability to reconcile divergent interests and advance forms of cooperation within an increasingly heterogeneous grouping. Its larger significance, however, lies in what comes next. India’s strategic autonomy will ultimately depend less on its ability to balance competing powers than on its capacity to build economic systems that give that autonomy material substance. 

The opportunity before New Delhi is therefore larger than BRICS diplomacy itself. India must invest in payment infrastructure, critical-mineral value chains, regional connectivity, development finance and diversified energy systems. If it can combine its diplomatic credibility with these economic capabilities, strategic autonomy will cease to be principally a posture of foreign policy and become an enduring foundation of India’s influence in the emerging global economic order.  / DAILY WORLD /( The writer is a researcher interested in topics including climate governance, geopolitics, history and society. Views expressed are her personal.)