The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, reflected the gradual restructuring of global power. Convened amid wars, sanctions, trade disputes and mounting uncertainty, it demonstrated that BRICS has evolved beyond an economic association of emerging markets into an influential geopolitical platform advancing the Global South’s aspirations for greater autonomy, representation and influence in international affairs.For Iran, the summit provided a major international stage on which to showcase its resilience and challenge attempts to isolate it. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s presence alongside the leaders of India, China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and a few other emerging economies projected an unmistakable message: despite sanctions, military pressure and regional instability, Iran remains an important participant in the developing multipolar order. BRICS membership has given Tehran diplomatic space, economic opportunities and access to influential partners at a time when its relations with the United States and several Western countries remain deeply strained.

The Iranian president used the BRICS Business Forum to present his country as a reliable strategic partner in energy supply chains and international transport. Iran possesses vast oil and natural-gas resources and occupies a geographically important position connecting Central Asia, the Gulf, the Caucasus and the Indian Ocean. Its potential role in the International North–South Transport Corridor further strengthens its importance to India, Russia and other BRICS economies. Pezeshkian did not simply offer to purchase energy from BRICS members. More accurately, he offered Iran as a strategic supplier and energy partner, while proposing that energy and other trade should increasingly be conducted in members’ national currencies. He argued that excessive reliance on a limited number of international currencies exposes national economies to political pressure and external financial shocks. He therefore called for reciprocal settlement mechanisms, instruments to manage currency risks and an expanded role for the New Development Bank in financing infrastructure and energy projects through local-currency loans and dedicated credit lines.

This proposal reflects Iran’s immediate need to reduce its vulnerability to Western sanctions, but it also addresses a wider concern shared by Russia, China and several developing countries. The repeated use of sanctions, tariff restrictions and access to international payment systems as instruments of foreign policy has encouraged BRICS members to explore alternative financial arrangements. The New Delhi Declaration consequently supported greater local-currency financing by the New Development Bank and continued work on faster, safer and less expensive cross-border payment systems. Nevertheless, BRICS did not endorse a common currency or the abrupt abandonment of the US dollar. Its approach was more gradual and pragmatic: members may settle more trade and investment in their own currencies according to national priorities. This distinction is important. BRICS is seeking to reduce financial dependence and expand strategic choice, not immediately replace the entire global monetary system.

India’s diplomacy was perhaps the summit’s most delicate achievement. New Delhi had to reconcile Iran’s demand for a strong response to military attacks and sanctions with the concerns of the United Arab Emirates and India’s own valuable partnerships with the United States, Israel and Europe. India maintains historical relations with Iran and depends upon stable energy and transport routes in West Asia. At the same time, its defence, technological and economic cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv has grown considerably. The declaration therefore expressed “deep concern” over the escalation in West Asia, opposed attacks on civilian infrastructure and safeguarded nuclear facilities, urged “maximum restraint,” and called for disputes to be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy. However, in discussing the US–Iran hostilities, it did not directly attribute responsibility to the United States or Israel. This carefully negotiated ambiguity allowed Iran to obtain collective recognition of its principal concerns while enabling India to protect its important relationships with Washington and the wider West. Significantly, however, the declaration did name Israel separately in its detailed discussion of Palestine, Gaza and Lebanon. Thus, it would be inaccurate to say that Israel was absent from the document.

The compromise should not simply be dismissed as weak language. BRICS operates by consensus and includes countries with sharply divergent security interests. Its foreign ministers had failed in May to produce a joint statement because of differences over the West Asian conflict. Securing unanimous approval in New Delhi was therefore an achievement in itself. Iran and the UAE accepted the declaration, while a meeting between Pezeshkian and the Abu Dhabi leadership demonstrated the usefulness of BRICS as a neutral space for direct communication and possible de-escalation. India’s balancing act represents its broader doctrine of strategic autonomy. It does not wish BRICS to become an anti-American military or ideological alliance. Instead, India wants it to serve as a practical platform for reforming global governance, strengthening development cooperation and expanding the voice of emerging economies. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Pezeshkian reaffirmed India’s call for dialogue while emphasizing freedom of navigation, commercial stability and the protection of seafarers in West Asia.

For China and Russia, however, BRICS carries a more distinctly geopolitical meaning. Both regard the organization as an instrument for reducing Western dominance and accelerating the transition towards multipolarity. Russia views BRICS as evidence that Western sanctions have not succeeded in isolating it internationally. China sees the grouping as a vehicle for enlarging its economic, diplomatic and institutional influence across Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Their support for local-currency trade, alternative financial mechanisms and reform of the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions reinforces their leadership within theemerging order.

Overall, China and Russia emerged from New Delhi as principal advocates, and increasingly important architects, of the emerging multipolar world order. Iran emerged as a resilient regional power capable of resisting diplomatic isolation, while India demonstrated that strategic autonomy could create space for consensus among opposing states. The summit did not establish a new global order overnight, nor did it eliminate the substantial differences within BRICS. It did, however, confirm that global power is becoming more widely distributed. The true significance of New Delhi lies in this shift. The Global South is no longer prepared merely to accept rules designed elsewhere. Through BRICS, it is seeking to participate actively in writing them. Whether the organization ultimately succeeds will depend upon its ability to transform declarations into workable systems of trade, finance, energy cooperation, and conflict resolution. But the direction of change is now unmistakable: the future international order will not be shapedby the West alone. 

( DAILY WORLD )