President Isaac Herzog’s decision to give Gadi Eisenkot the first chance to form Israel’s next government creates an opening for political change after the inconclusive election of 27 October. Herzog informed Eisenkot of his choice on 7 November and scheduled the formal assignment for the following day. Benjamin Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister while negotiations proceed. The regional significance of the choice will depend on whether Eisenkot can assemble a government capable of making and sustaining difficult decisions on Gaza, the West Bank and military escalation. 

The arithmetic of governing

Likud won 27 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, the largest tally for any party. Netanyahu’s broader bloc won 53 seats, while Eisenkot’s four-party alliance secured 48. The 19 members of two Arab-led lists recommended Eisenkot, bringing his total to 67, against 46 for Netanyahu. United Torah Judaism’s seven members recommended neither candidate. Under Israel’s Basic Law, Eisenkot has 28 days from the formal assignment, with a possible extension of up to 14 days. A coalition with 61 seats commands an absolute majority, while a minority government can take office if it wins more votes in favour than against at the confidence vote. Eisenkot has ruled out bringing Arab-led parties into government, though they could offer outside support if his allies agree. Adding Shas and United Torah Judaism would give him 61 seats, but concessions on military service exemptions could divide his alliance. The Arab-led lists’ endorsement strengthens the case for public talks with representatives of Palestinian citizens of Israel on equal citizenship, public safety and services. If Eisenkot fails, Herzog may ask another Knesset member to form a government. A majority of lawmakers may later nominate a candidate in writing. Failed talks could prolong Netanyahu’s caretaker government and delay policy changes. 

The Middle East

Gaza offers the most immediate test. A ceasefire brokered by the United States in 2025 envisaged reconstruction, but by early November 2026 rebuilding had barely begun. The terms of Hamas’s disarmament and Israel’s military withdrawal remained unresolved. A government led by Eisenkot could use negotiations with regional mediators to secure regular humanitarian access and agree on a timetable for reconstruction with meaningful Palestinian participation. An agreement that leaves civilian life dependent on indefinite emergency arrangements would offer little basis for lasting security. For families living in damaged buildings or makeshift shelters, progress would begin with reliable relief deliveries and the ability to return safely. Those are benchmarks that mediators and donors can track while disputes over security arrangements and governance continue. 

Eisenkot criticised settler violence and Netanyahu’s conduct of the Gaza campaign. He also served in Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet and has defended a hard military posture rooted in his experience fighting Hezbollah. The composition of his cabinet will therefore matter as much as his own record. Action against settler violence and restraint on settlement expansion would help preserve the territorial basis for a negotiated Palestinian state. That prospect bears directly on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalise relations with Israel. Meanwhile, indirect US–Iran talks mediated by Qatar give a new Israeli government a reason to consult closely with Washington before military decisions that could expose Lebanon and the Gulf to another round of escalation. 

The United States

The Associated Press projected Democratic control of both chambers of Congress after the US midterms. The incoming Congress begins its term on 3 January 2027, while Donald Trump remains president. Democratic committee chairs will be able to convene hearings, scrutinise arms transfers and press for conditions through legislation and appropriations. Trump’s announcement that annual US military funding of roughly $4 billion would end after 2026, with arms sales continuing, adds a separate uncertainty. The existing memorandum envisages $3.8 billion a year through fiscal 2028, subject to congressional appropriations. The administration has yet to explain how it would implement an earlier end to the funding. An end to grant assistance would change who pays for American weapons. Purchases with Israeli funds could continue, while Congress could still scrutinise transfers and set the terms for any jointly financed defence programmes. 

An Eisenkot government would have reason to rebuild working relationships with both parties in Washington. Verifiable commitments on humanitarian access and accountability for the use of US-supplied weapons would give both parties a basis for sustained engagement. For Congress, oversight could make US support more accountable by specifying what officials must report and what conduct could trigger a review. Diplomacy over Gaza and Iran would continue to require decisions by the White House and cooperation from regional governments. 

India and regional stability

India and Israel elevated their relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership in February 2026, with programmes in defence, technology, agriculture and water management. Those institutional ties give New Delhi a basis for working with any Israeli government. India has also reaffirmed at the United Nations its support for a sovereign, viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. It should give practical effect to both positions by sustaining bilateral cooperation with Israel while pressing for humanitarian access, Palestinian participation in reconstruction and a credible political process. New Delhi also has reason to consider how a prolonged regional crisis might affect deliveries of Israeli defence equipment. Joint production and local maintenance capacity could reduce exposure to interruptions and give practical content to the partnership announced in February. 

India’s wider interests are bound up with the security of its citizens in the Gulf, energy supplies and freedom of navigation. The proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor illustrates the interdependence. Its northern leg envisages freight moving from the Gulf through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel to Europe. Progress will require transit agreements and confidence that the route can operate through periods of political tension. A change of leadership in Israel could ease talks on connectivity if it also improves relations with Arab governments. New Delhi has a direct stake in working with Washington and Gulf capitals on de-escalation even while coalition negotiations in Israel run their course. 

Herzog has given Eisenkot a chance to demonstrate that a broader parliamentary agreement can support a different regional policy. The first evidence will come from whom he is willing to negotiate with and what his prospective partners agree to put in writing. For Palestinians facing displacement, Israelis living with insecurity, and neighbouring countries exposed to renewed war, the test will be whether those commitments yield sustained humanitarian access, less violence and a credible route back to political negotiations.

( Prof Nehaluddin Ahmad, LL.D. Professor of Law, Sultan Sharif Ali Islamic University (UNISSA), Brunei, Email: ahmadnehal@yahoo.com.)