Can a war end on paper while continuing at sea? The unfolding crisis in the Strait of Hormuz suggests that in modern geopolitics, law often yields to strategy. The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime corridor linking the Persian Gulf to the open seas, has once again emerged as the epicentre of global geopolitical tension. Carrying nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil, its stability is not merely regional—it is civilizational. The current crisis, marked by reciprocal blockades imposed by the United States and Iran, raises a profound legal question: can the United States’ naval blockade and seizure of vessels be treated as piracy, particularly in light of its own declaration that the conflict has effectively ended?

The controversy is sharpened by President Trump’s formal communication to Congress asserting that hostilities with Iran have “terminated,” even as U.S. naval forces continue to enforce a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. This dual posture, declaring peace while maintaining coercive maritime measures, creates a constitutional and legal inconsistency. Under the War Powers Resolution, such declarations aim to satisfy domestic legal timelines, yet internationally, continued interdictions signal ongoing hostilities. If accepted, this approach risks normalising a hybrid state of “post-war coercion,” where force persists without formal war, further blurring the already fragile boundaries between lawful enforcement and unlawful maritime control. At the heart of this debate lies the distinction between piracy as a criminal act under international law and state-authorised military or enforcement action.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the foundational framework of modern maritime law, defines piracy as illegal acts of violence or detention committed “for private ends” by private actors on the high seas. This definition is precise and restrictive, excluding actions carried out by state vessels operating under official authority. On a strict legal view, U.S. naval actions enforcing sanctions or a blockade may not constitute piracy, which requires private actors and private gain, aiming for ransom. and keeping the resources as a “profitable business “. The U.S. forces have intercepted ships near the Strait of Hormuz. While politically persuasive, labeling them piracy may be a category error.

However, the legal clarity ends here, and the controversy begins.

The United States defends its blockade as a lawful wartime measure under the law of armed conflict at sea, where blockades are permitted if declared, effective, and non-discriminatory, even without formal war declarations. However, this justification weakens if the conflict is deemed “over.” A blockade presupposes ongoing hostilities; once they cease, the legal framework shifts to peacetime law, where coercive actions against foreign vessels are highly restricted, rendering the continued blockade legally questionable. The U.S. signed the convention in 1994 but never ratified it, with significant political opposition citing concerns over national sovereignty.

This creates a paradox: if the war continues, the blockade may be justified as a wartime measure; if the war has ended, the same blockade risks being characterised as an unlawful interference with freedom of navigation, potentially violating customary international law.

The Strait of Hormuz is not an ordinary maritime zone; it is an international strait. Under UNCLOS and customary law, all states enjoy an unrestricted right of transit passage through such straits. The International Maritime Organization has consistently maintained that no state has the legal authority to block navigation through international straits, though Iran has not ratified UNCLOS.

Thus, while the United States asserts that its blockade targets only vessels connected to Iranian ports, the practical effect of interdictions, warnings, and seizures risks chilling broader navigation and undermining the principle of free passage. With nearly 20 percent of global oil transiting this route, even limited disruption reverberates far beyond the Gulf, affecting energy markets, trade flows, and economic stability worldwide.

Iran, for its part, has labelled U.S. actions as “piracy” and “state terrorism.” While this language is politically charged, it reflects a deeper legal grievance: that unilateral enforcement actions in international waters, especially outside a clearly defined armed conflict, violate the core principles of maritime law. However, equating such actions with piracy remains doctrinally problematic. Even if the U.S. blockade is unlawful or excessive, it would more appropriately be characterised as a wrongful use of force or an illegal maritime interdiction, rather than piracy in the strict legal sense. The distinction is not merely semantic; it is foundational to maintaining coherence in international legal categories.

The President’s own rhetoric, reportedly likening U.S. naval actions to “piracy” and even describing them as “profitable,” further complicates the discourse. While politically provocative, such statements do not alter the legal classification. International law is concerned not with rhetoric, but with objective criteria: the nature of the actors, the purpose of the act, and the governing legal framework. Yet, rhetoric matters in another sense; it erodes legitimacy. When state actors appear to blur the line between lawful enforcement and opportunistic seizure, they risk undermining the very legal order they claim to defend. The broader issue is not merely whether the United States is committing piracy, but whether the current crisis represents a collapse of maritime legal discipline. Both Iran’s attempt to control or tax passage and the U.S. blockade of Iranian shipping challenge the integrity of the international legal regime governing the seas.

This crisis also exposes a structural weakness: the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. The United Nations Security Council, paralysed by geopolitical rivalries, has been unable to act decisively. Without a neutral arbiter, legal norms risk being subordinated to power politics.

The implications are far-reaching. If powerful states can unilaterally impose blockades or restrict navigation in critical chokepoints, the precedent could extend to other strategic waterways—from the South China Sea to the Black Sea. The principle of freedom of navigation, painstakingly developed over centuries, may gradually erode.

In conclusion, the United States cannot, in strict legal terms, be labelled as engaging in piracy under UNCLOS, as its actions are state-authorized and framed within naval warfare and sanctions enforcement. Yet, the legality of the blockade remains contested, especially given claims that hostilities have ended. The greater concern is the normalization of legal ambiguity, where states operate in a grey zone between war and peace. The Strait of Hormuz thus becomes not only a strategic chokepoint but a test of legal principles, where the ultimate casualty risks being the credibility of international law itself. / DAILY WORLD /

( Prof Nehaluddin Ahmad, LL.D. Professor of Law, Sultan Sharif Ali Islamic University (UNISSA), Brunei, Email: ahmadnehal@yahoo.com.)